Risk-Factors for Exposure Associated With SARS-CoV-2 Detection After Recent Known or Potential COVID-19 Exposures Among Patients Seeking Medical Care at a Large Urban, Public Hospital in Fulton County, Georgia - A Cross-Sectional Investigation.

We aimed to describe frequency of COVID-19 exposure risk factors among patients presenting for medical care at an urban, public hospital serving mostly uninsured/Medicare/Medicaid clients and risk factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Consenting, adult patients seeking care at a public hospital from August to November 2020 were enrolled in this cross-sectional investigation. Saliva, anterior nasal and nasopharyngeal swabs were collected and tested for SARS-CoV-2 using RT-PCR. Participant demographics, close contact, and activities ≤14 days prior to enrollment were collected through interview. Logistic regression was used to identify risk factors associated with testing positive for SARS-CoV-2. Among 1,078 participants, 51.8% were male, 57.0% were aged ≥50 years, 81.3% were non-Hispanic Black, and 7.6% had positive SARS-CoV-2 tests. Only 2.7% reported COVID-19 close contact ≤14 days before enrollment; this group had 6.79 adjusted odds of testing positive (95%CI = 2.78-16.62) than those without a reported exposure. Among participants who did not report COVID-19 close contact, working in proximity to ≥10 people (adjusted OR = 2.17; 95%CI = 1.03-4.55), choir practice (adjusted OR = 11.85; 95%CI = 1.44-97.91), traveling on a plane (adjusted OR = 5.78; 95%CI = 1.70-19.68), and not participating in an essential indoor activity (i.e., grocery shopping, public transit use, or visiting a healthcare facility; adjusted OR = 2.15; 95%CI = 1.07-4.30) were associated with increased odds of testing positive. Among this population of mostly Black, non-Hispanic participants seeking care at a public hospital, we found several activities associated with testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 infection in addition to close contact with a case. Understanding high-risk activities for SARS-CoV-2 infection among different communities is important for issuing awareness and prevention strategies.

Epidemiologic, Immunologic, and Virus Characteristics in Patients With Paired Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Serology and Reverse-Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction Testing.

BACKGROUND: The natural history and clinical progression of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections can be better understood using combined serological and reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing. METHODS: Nasopharyngeal swabs and serum were collected at a single time-point from patients at an urban, public hospital during August-November 2020 and tested for SARS-CoV-2 using RT-PCR, viral culture, and anti-spike pan-immunoglobulin antibody testing. Participant demographics and symptoms were collected through interview. The χ 2 and Fisher exact tests were used to identify associations between RT-PCR and serology results with presence of viable virus and frequency of symptoms. RESULTS: Among 592 participants, 129 (21.8%) had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection by RT-PCR or serology. Presence of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies was strongly associated with lack of viable virus (P = .016). COVID-19 symptom frequency was similar for patients testing RT-PCR positive/seronegative and patients testing RT-PCR positive/seropositive. Patients testing RT-PCR positive/seronegative reported headaches, fatigue, diarrhea, and vomiting at rates not statistically significantly different from those testing RT-PCR negative/seropositive. CONCLUSIONS: While patients testing SARS-CoV-2 seropositive were unlikely to test positive for viable virus and were therefore at low risk for forward transmission, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) symptoms were common. Paired SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR and antibody testing provides more nuanced understanding of patients' COVID-19 status.

COVID-19 Case Investigations Among Federally Quarantined Evacuees From Wuhan, China, and Exposed Personnel at a US Military Base, United States, February 5-21, 2020.

In February 2020, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, 232 evacuees from Wuhan, China, were placed under federal 14-day quarantine upon arrival at a US military base in San Diego, California. We describe the monitoring of evacuees and responders for symptoms of COVID-19, case and contact investigations, infection control procedures, and lessons learned to inform future quarantine protocols for evacuated people from a hot spot resulting from a novel pathogen. Thirteen (5.6%) evacuees had COVID-19-compatible symptoms and 2 (0.9%) had laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2. Two case investigations identified 43 contacts; 3 (7.0%) contacts had symptoms but tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Daily symptom and temperature screening of evacuees and enacted infection control procedures resulted in rapid case identification and isolation and no detected secondary transmission among evacuees or responders. Lessons learned highlight the challenges associated with public health response to a novel pathogen and the evolution of mitigation strategies as knowledge of the pathogen evolves.

Effects of Patient Characteristics on Diagnostic Performance of Self-Collected Samples for SARS-CoV-2 Testing.

We evaluated the performance of self-collected anterior nasal swab (ANS) and saliva samples compared with healthcare worker-collected nasopharyngeal swab specimens used to test for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). We used the same PCR diagnostic panel to test all self-collected and healthcare worker-collected samples from participants at a public hospital in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. Among 1,076 participants, 51.9% were men, 57.1% were >50 years of age, 81.2% were Black (non-Hispanic), and 74.9% reported >1 chronic medical condition. In total, 8.0% tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Compared with nasopharyngeal swab samples, ANS samples had a sensitivity of 59% and saliva samples a sensitivity of 68%. Among participants tested 3-7 days after symptom onset, ANS samples had a sensitivity of 80% and saliva samples a sensitivity of 85%. Sensitivity varied by specimen type and patient characteristics. These findings can help physicians interpret PCR results for SARS-CoV-2.

SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Dynamics in a Sleep-Away Camp.

OBJECTIVES: In late June 2020, a large outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) occurred at a sleep-away youth camp in Georgia, affecting primarily persons ≤21 years. We conducted a retrospective cohort study among campers and staff (attendees) to determine the extent of the outbreak and assess factors contributing to transmission. METHODS: Attendees were interviewed to ascertain demographic characteristics, known exposures to COVID-19 and community exposures, and mitigation measures before, during, and after attending camp. COVID-19 case status was determined for all camp attendees on the basis of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) test results and reported symptoms. We calculated attack rates and instantaneous reproduction numbers and sequenced SARS-CoV-2 viral genomes from the outbreak. RESULTS: Among 627 attendees, the median age was 15 years (interquartile range: 12-16 years); 56% (351 of 627) of attendees were female. The attack rate was 56% (351 of 627) among all attendees. On the basis of date of illness onset or first positive test result on a specimen collected, 12 case patients were infected before arriving at camp and 339 case patients were camp associated. Among 288 case patients with available symptom information, 45 (16%) were asymptomatic. Despite cohorting, 50% of attendees reported direct contact with people outside their cabin cohort. On the first day of camp session, the instantaneous reproduction number was 10. Viral genomic diversity was low. CONCLUSIONS: Few introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into a youth congregate setting resulted in a large outbreak. Testing strategies should be combined with prearrival quarantine, routine symptom monitoring with appropriate isolation and quarantine, cohorting, social distancing, mask wearing, and enhanced disinfection and hand hygiene. Promotion of mitigation measures among younger populations is needed.

Adolescent with COVID-19 as the Source of an Outbreak at a 3-Week Family Gathering - Four States, June-July 2020.

There is increasing evidence that children and adolescents can efficiently transmit SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1-3). During July-August 2020, four state health departments and CDC investigated a COVID-19 outbreak that occurred during a 3-week family gathering of five households in which an adolescent aged 13 years was the index and suspected primary patient; 11 subsequent cases occurred.

SARS-CoV-2 Transmission and Infection Among Attendees of an Overnight Camp - Georgia, June 2020.

Limited data are available about transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), among youths. During June 17-20, an overnight camp in Georgia (camp A) held orientation for 138 trainees and 120 staff members; staff members remained for the first camp session, scheduled during June 21-27, and were joined by 363 campers and three senior staff members on June 21. Camp A adhered to the measures in Georgia's Executive Order* that allowed overnight camps to operate beginning on May 31, including requiring all trainees, staff members, and campers to provide documentation of a negative viral SARS-CoV-2 test ≤12 days before arriving. Camp A adopted most† components of CDC's Suggestions for Youth and Summer Camps§ to minimize the risk for SARS-CoV-2 introduction and transmission. Measures not implemented were cloth masks for campers and opening windows and doors for increased ventilation in buildings. Cloth masks were required for staff members. Camp attendees were cohorted by cabin and engaged in a variety of indoor and outdoor activities, including daily vigorous singing and cheering. On June 23, a teenage staff member left camp A after developing chills the previous evening. The staff member was tested and reported a positive test result for SARS-CoV-2 the following day (June 24). Camp A officials began sending campers home on June 24 and closed the camp on June 27. On June 25, the Georgia Department of Public Health (DPH) was notified and initiated an investigation. DPH recommended that all attendees be tested and self-quarantine, and isolate if they had a positive test result.